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14. ABSTRACT The lack of standardized procedures among the U.S. military and other disaster relief agencies results in inefficiencies during foreign disaster relief operations. These inefficiencies normally include breakdowns in information sharing, duplication of effort and delays in providing effective relief across the full spectrum of response forces. The United Nations has recently developed a "Cluster Approach" to international disaster relief which has gained notoriety as an effective method to mitigate many of these inefficiencies. The "Cluster Approach" groups capabilities of disaster relief support into clusters. Donor countries then pledge support in each cluster in order to develop "a coordinated approach to disaster relief that is predictable, accountable to donors and doesn't duplicate the efforts of different organizations." This paper proposes the U.S. should standardize the U.S. military force package utilized for foreign disaster relief. It also proposes that this package is integrated into the U.N. Cluster Approach framework.					
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Standardizing U.S. Military Foreign Disaster Relief with the U.N.

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Standardizing U.S. Military Foreign Disaster Relief with the U.N

The lack of standardized procedures among the U.S. military and other disaster relief agencies results in inefficiencies during foreign disaster relief operations. These inefficiencies normally include breakdowns in information sharing, duplication of effort and delays in providing effective relief across the full spectrum of response forces. The United Nations has recently developed a “Cluster Approach” to international disaster relief which has gained notoriety as an effective method to mitigate many of these inefficiencies. The “Cluster Approach” groups capabilities of disaster relief support into clusters. Donor countries then pledge support in each cluster in order to develop “a coordinated approach to disaster relief that is predictable, accountable to donors and doesn’t duplicate the efforts of different organizations.” This paper proposes the U.S. should standardize the U.S. military force package utilized for foreign disaster relief. It also proposes that this package is integrated into the U.N. Cluster Approach framework.

Thesis

The lack of standardized procedures among the U.S. military and other disaster relief agencies results in inefficiencies during disaster relief operations. Standardization between the U.S. military and other relief agencies will result in better unity of effort, establishment of habitual support relationships, better information management and less duplication of effort.

Introduction

Disasters are unpredictable events which vary immensely by nature and scope. Even though advances in technology have assisted in early warning and more capable infrastructures, disasters still cause catastrophic damages to even the most advanced nations. Although disasters are highly unpredictable events, relief efforts for disasters have many commonalities. Regardless of disaster type, relief efforts always revolve around providing basic needs for affected populations. These needs normally include search and rescue, medical care, food, water, shelter, early recovery and most importantly a response force capable of coordinating these efforts. Frequently during disaster response there is an outpouring of relief aid, monetary contributions and government and non-government agencies willing to help. However, what is many times lacking is centralized planning, organization and coordination on how to best organize, distribute and provide relief for affected populations. Due to this, there is rarely unity of effort among agencies that support disaster relief operations. This results in breakdowns in information sharing, duplication of effort and delays in providing effective relief across the full spectrum of response forces.

Recently the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) developed a relief strategy termed the “Cluster Approach” in order to counter the shortfalls discussed above.¹ The basic premise behind OCHA’s cluster approach is pre-determining

which agencies will bring the required relief capabilities. The U.N. has done this by categorizing relief support into “clusters”. The clusters the United Nations uses are: information management, protection, agriculture, telecommunications, early recovery, education, sanitation, water and hygiene, logistics, nutrition, emergency shelter, camp management and health.² These clusters are further segregated by government and non-government agencies at the national and international level that are capable of providing relief support. One of the key agencies countries can provide relief support with is military forces.³ The idea of the Cluster Approach is for every country to identify the clusters that their support agencies can best support relief efforts. Each country then pledges what type of assets their agencies will habitually provide within that cluster. The United Nation’s desired end state is “a coordinated approach to disaster relief that is predictable, accountable to donors and doesn’t duplicate the efforts of different organizations.”⁴

Arguments

The United States would benefit from integrating its foreign disaster relief assets into the U.N. cluster framework. In doing so, the United States would assist in simplifying and eliminating redundancy during international disaster relief efforts. A key asset the U.S. can pledge for this endeavor is U.S. military forces. The U.S. military is particularly well suited for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations and has a history of supporting these types of operations. Some historical examples of U.S. military support include: the Berlin Airlift (1948), Operation IDA in Iran (1962), Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh (1991), Hurricane Andrew USA (1992), Operation Support Hope in Rwanda (1994), Operation Unified Assistance Indonesia (2005) and most recently Operation Unified Response Haiti (2010).⁵ Along with experience, the U.S. military has “unmatched

capabilities in logistics, command and control, communications, and mobility” and the ability to deploy these capabilities worldwide.⁶ With this experience and unique capabilities the U.S. military could augment the U.N. clusters of Logistics, Information Management, Telecommunications, Early Recovery, Water and Health.

In order to integrate U.S. foreign disaster relief efforts with the United Nations, the U.S. would need to standardize the military force package it uses to support foreign disaster relief. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) already suggests this is a goal. The NSS states that “humanitarian crisis response will be in concert with the international community.”⁷ Furthermore, “we must leverage the use of international institutions such as the U.N. to help maintain international peace and security and promote global cooperation.”⁸ Integrating with the U.N. on disaster relief would not only help achieve the above stated U.S. goals, it would also legitimately assist the U.N. in accomplishing their goal of more predictable, organized international disaster relief efforts. Although challenges will occur with developing a standard U.S. military foreign disaster relief package, this makes sense for many reasons.

First, standardization of U.S. military foreign disaster relief forces adds predictability during volatile crisis situations. This predictability not only improves our ability to react quickly, but also improves our national and international partner’s awareness of what capabilities to expect from the U.S. military. By standardizing a U.S. military force package with the United Nations, capability gaps can be identified earlier, rehearsals and exercises can occur and standard operating procedures can be solidified. This will help ensure there is a common operating picture for all agencies normally involved in disaster relief operations and will assist in limiting duplication of effort. This will greatly enhance overall effectiveness during initial operations.

Second, a standardized U.S. military force package will be better prepared and trained to conduct disaster relief operations. If specific U.S. military units and platforms are used as standard packages for disaster relief, these units can develop long term training plans for foreign disaster relief operations. These long range plans would include national and international level exercises that increase their proficiency and interoperability. This training would be essential in mitigating the uncertainty and confusion that occurs at the onset of disaster relief operations.

Last, standardization can save the U.S. money during what appears to be a budget constrained near-term future. The natural tendency for military planners at the onset of disaster relief operations is to bring every asset that may be required. Frequently these plans do not take into consideration other relief agencies capabilities. Due to this, there is frequent duplication of effort spanning over a myriad of areas. Standardizing the U.S. military force package will decrease waste and spending by only using U.S. military assets that are needed to bridge capability gaps in the overall relief effort.

Counterarguments and Rebuttals

There are two counterarguments to this proposal. First, it is impossible to predict what forces will be required to support disaster relief operations. As stated at the beginning of the introduction, “disasters are unpredictable events which vary immensely by nature and scope”. Due to this, no amount of pre-planning and standardization will result in an optimal response force. Even with a standard international response force developed through the U.N. cluster approach, capability gaps will exist that will need to be filled. Even with habitual support relationships, inefficiencies will occur between support agencies due to the inherent volatile conditions of foreign disaster relief operations.

It is true that disasters are nearly impossible to predict, however, with few exceptions, the U.S. military response force for foreign disaster relief operations has been fairly uniform. One exception was the large scale ground deployment to Haiti in support of Operation Unified Response. In almost every other case, the U.S. military supported foreign disaster relief efforts, with portions of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), hospital ships, engineers, rotary wing assets, ground logistical units, port opening elements and strategic airlift. Standardizing this force package will assist the agencies responsible for leading foreign disaster relief by giving predictability of U.S. military relief assets. Although relief forces will never be optimal, lack of resources is rarely the primary problem with foreign disaster relief. The primary problem is the coordination between a myriad of relief agencies at the onset of operations. Predetermining what agencies provide specific capabilities ahead of time will undoubtedly improve interaction between these agencies through habitual support relationships.

The second counterargument pertains to the U.S. national leadership's desire to establish a standard U.S. military force package for every foreign disaster relief scenario. U.S. presidential administrations will place different importance and emphasis on the level of support the U.S. provides during every relief operation. This level of support will be commensurate with the size and type of the disaster, location, national and international opinion and the importance of the affected countries to U.S. foreign policy. One administration might find it acceptable to deploy a smaller, more mobile force with less capability. Another president might find this inadequate to achieve U.S. national strategic objectives. Due to this, it is futile to attempt to standardize a U.S. military foreign disaster relief force.

Although there are many influences that could change the president's outlook on the size and type of support package, there are also many advantages in keeping this force package standard. First, it can help dispel distrust in the international community that the U.S. only conducts these types of operations to gain influence in the affected area of the world. Through standardization of the U.S. military force package, each nation that receives U.S. support will receive the same type of support regardless of their standing with the U.S. This will communicate to the world that our intentions are only to help affected populations and not to gain influence in the region. Integration with the U.N. reinforces this point. There are other means to gain influence with countries that are important to U.S. foreign policy. Using foreign disaster relief to this end is sending the wrong message. Second, standardizing the U.S. military force packages for foreign disaster relief will minimize the reaction time required to provide relief. Time will be gained through faster deployment of forces and more fluidity among habitual response agencies. Public opinion is a legitimate influence to the U.S. president during foreign disaster relief. Negative public opinion normally originates through what is perceived as a slow reaction from the U.S. Standardization will positively impact reaction time and ultimately public opinion.

Analyzing Foreign Disaster Relief Operations

Numerous U.S. military forces have been used to adequately support foreign disaster relief operations. These forces have comprised of various services with differing levels of effectiveness. In determining a standard U.S. military foreign disaster relief force, historical cases must be considered. However, it is important to first analyze disaster relief operations through time, space and force factors. Through this analysis, elements which are essential to effective relief support can be determined.

Time, Space and Force Factors of Foreign Disaster Relief Operations

Time is the most critical factor when planning and executing foreign disaster relief operations. Time is critical for a myriad of reasons. First, human life can only be sustained by providing it with certain necessities. Over time, neglect of these necessities results in severe incapacitation or death. Primary to the sustainment of life are food, water and medical care. In many cases during disasters, affected populations are partially or completely blocked from these necessities of life. Due to this, time directly affects the survivability of human beings after a disaster. Human survival times vary without food, water and medical care. However, in general the more expediently relief arrives, the better chance for human survival.

Space factors are also important when planning and executing foreign disaster relief operations. The first space consideration is where the disaster occurs in relation to relief personnel. If relief personnel are embarking from another country, valuable response time will be lost transiting relief forces to the affected country. Similarly, if the disaster occurs in a remote location, time will be lost moving personnel to the affected area. Both of the above stated factors on space reinforce the importance of the factor of time. Although the space a disaster occurs in is critical, the most critical aspect is still the amount of time it takes to reach affected populations.

Force factors also revert back to the key critical factor of time. Force factors pertain to the type of force that is used to support foreign disaster relief operations. The key aspects of this force are their capabilities to support the specific disaster relief operation, their ability to mobilize to the affected area and their ability to command and control their forces. All of these force characteristics are tied to limiting the amount of time it takes for a force to deploy

to an affected area and provide relief to an affected population. Key to a force providing effective support immediately is the forces ability to attain timely situational awareness, share information internally and externally and command and control its forces.

Operational Function Balance

Through the analysis of time, space and force factors it is evident that the functions of Movement and Maneuver and Command and Control are the most critical to effective foreign disaster relief operations. The most effective forces in these types of operations are forces that can bring the right capabilities in the shortest amount of time. In addition, a flexible, adaptable force that has habitual command and control relationships is highly desirable. In the following paragraphs three historical case studies of U.S. military support during foreign disaster relief operations will be considered.

Operation Unified Response

On 12 January 2010, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake struck the country of Haiti. The earthquake's epicenter was approximately 17 kilometers southwest of the capital and economic hub of the country, Port Au Prince.⁹ Loss of life was estimated at 220,000 with an additional 300,000 injured.¹⁰ In the immediate weeks following the earthquake over 1.3 million people were living in temporary camps in the vicinity of Port Au Prince, and another 500,000 people were seeking refuge in other parts of the country.¹¹ This immense quantity of displaced people resulted in large demand for food and potable water. Over 105,000 homes were destroyed and more than 208,000 homes were damaged leaving many people trapped under rubble and in need of medical assistance, food and water.¹² Over 1,300 schools and 50 hospitals were damaged or destroyed.¹³ In addition, "the earthquake damaged around 70 kilometers of main roads including certain heavily used routes". It also severely

damaged both the main sea and airports in Port Au Prince.¹⁴ The earthquake was the most devastating earthquake to strike Haiti in 200 years and “created an unprecedented situation, affecting the country’s most populous area as well as its economic and administrative center.”¹⁵

The international response to the earthquake was named Operation Unified Response. Response efforts were assisted or supported by 140 countries, over 1,000 Non-Government Organizations, the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH), United States Agency for International Development and a large U.S. military force package containing over 22,000 personnel and 33 ships.¹⁶ The U.S. military force package included elements of both the 22nd and 24th MEU, 2nd Brigade 82nd Airborne, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, the USNS Comfort, numerous special operations and enabling forces and a JTF headquarters.¹⁷ The JTF consisted of various agencies. The U.S. Southern Command sent a small staff to begin the formation of JTF Haiti under the leadership of LTG Ken Keen, who was serving as the Deputy Commander of SOUTHCOM. This staff was augmented by United States Joint Forces Command Joint Enabling Capabilities Command and the 18th Airborne Corps from the U.S. Army. In addition, augmentees were sent from various organizations in the Department of Defense to augment SOUTHCOMs staff. In order to synchronize operations between government and non-government agencies a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) was formed in Haiti which was lauded by LTG Keen as a key to “building a common operating picture of what was required.”¹⁸ JTF Haiti’s coordination of humanitarian relief was extremely successful when studying end state data. In total over 2.6 million liters of water and 17 million pounds of food were distributed by task force personnel.¹⁹ Task force medical personnel conducted 343 MEDEVACS and

treated 9,758 people.²⁰ Task force engineers cleared over 12,724 cubic yards of debris and assessed over 25,000 structures.²¹ Last, air and seaport capacities were increased well above pre-disaster capacities.²² With these successes came numerous shortfalls. First, the immense size of the force package became a logistical strain on itself. In order to support a U.S. response force of this size entailed an enormous logistical effort in an environment that was constrained through the use of only one Air Port of Debarkation. In addition to this, the relief effort was estimated to cost the United States government over \$234 million, utilized many soldiers, marines and sailors who were recently redeployed from combat and raised eyebrows in the international community as to what exactly U.S. intentions were in Haiti.²³

Operation Unified Assistance

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was a unique disaster in it severely impacted multiple countries. The disaster stemmed from a 9.0 magnitude earthquake in the Indian Ocean 150 kilometers off the northern coast of Sumatra.²⁴ This earthquake caused a tsunami which impacted Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Maldives, Malaysia, Myanmar and Somalia.²⁵ This tsunami caused 157,314 deaths and the displaced 1.6 million people.²⁶ Of these figures over 90% of the affected populations were from Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India.²⁷ In addition to human loss of life, the disaster heavily destroyed the urban infrastructure of Aceh and the North Sumatra province of Indonesia. The eastern coasts of India, Sri Lanka and the western coast of Thailand also suffered extensive infrastructure damage.

The U.S. was one of 82 countries that provided either direct assistance or monetary support to tsunami victims.²⁸ The U.S. military relief effort was named Operation Unified Assistance and focused on support to Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. U.S. military relief

efforts were supported by the Lincoln Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) in the vicinity of Indonesia, the Bon Homme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) in the vicinity of Sri Lanka, the USNS Mercy and various logistical support units on the ground in Thailand.²⁹ U.S. military command and control for the operation was led by Lieutenant General Robert Blackmon who was serving as the commander of U.S. forces in Okinawa at the time of the disaster.³⁰ Lieutenant General Blackmon's joint staff was developed and named the Combined Support Force. In addition, a coordination cell for U.S. military, host nation military, United States Agency for International Development and Non-Governmental Organizations was developed and named the Coalition Coordination Center. These Command and Control organizations as well as the primary logistical base of operations were located in Utapao, Thailand.³¹ From this location a myriad of fixed wing heavy lift was coordinated sending relief supplies to various Airports of Debarkation within the impacted region. Relief operations consisted of fixed and rotary wing movement of relief supplies, engineer debris clearance support and medical support. Limited logistical ground support forces were deployed with the exception of forces in Thailand due to restrictions set by host nations. Due to this relief operations were continuously plagued by the lack of onward movement of supplies from airports inland.³² In total over 322,000 gallons of water, 20,000 tons of food and 2,959 tons of supplies were delivered to affected populations.³³ In addition 32,000 patients were treated by U.S. military medical personnel.³⁴

Operation Lifeline

On 8 October 2005, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake centered in the vicinity of Muzaffarabad devastated northeastern Pakistan. Over 73,000 people were killed with another 70,000 severely injured. 203,579 housing units were destroyed leaving millions of people

homeless.³⁵ The devastation to the already austere infrastructure included blockage or damage to over 45% of the roads which disrupted 77,000 household's water supply schemes.³⁶ In addition, the disaster left over 2.3 million people without adequate food.³⁷ This earthquake was "arguably the most debilitating natural disaster in Pakistan's history", and without question drew enormous concerns from U.S. national leadership about the stability of this important region.³⁸

The international response to relief efforts was named Operation Lifeline and included support or aid from over 31 nations and numerous Non-Government Organizations (NGOs).³⁹ The U.S. military was able to provide responsive support to relief efforts mainly through rotary wing assets, heavy air and sea-lift, field medical assets, cargo transfer, engineer assets, water purification assets and a combat logistics regiment.⁴⁰ Response time was reduced through the immediate availability of heavy lift rotary assets in bordering Afghanistan and the relatively quick deployment of the 212 Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) which was flown in from Angola.⁴¹ U.S. military efforts were coordinated through members of Expeditionary Strike Group 1 staff and led by ESG-1 Commander, Admiral Michael LeFever.⁴² Command and Control was established through the development of the Combined Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan (CDAC-PAK) and heavily relied on coordination with the Pakistani Military and United States Agency for International Development.⁴³ Relief operations were viewed as one the most successful ever for a disaster of that scale.⁴⁴ In total over 370,000 people received relief supplies, over 35,000 people were seen for injuries and over 5,900 rotary wing relief missions were flown in support of the operation.⁴⁵

Commonalities in Foreign Disaster Relief

Through study of the disaster responses in the above cases and examination of the critical factors of disaster response, several things can be determined. First, there is legitimacy in the United Nation's Cluster Approach to disaster relief operations. In almost every instance of disaster relief the same types of assets were required. U.S. military assets were similar in function in each instance and could easily be categorized within the framework of the United Nation's "clusters". In addition, each operation was truly an international multi-agency effort. Second, the response force size did not directly equate to more effective support. During Operation Unified Response the size of the force actually impeded progress at times due to its enormous ground logistical footprint. Third, in almost every instance more mobile forces that were already close to the affected area were used to support the operation for limited duration. The only operation that had a sizeable ground footprint was Operation Unified Response which was in close proximity to the U.S. Last, various types of U.S. organizations were utilized for command and control. In each instance, what seemed to work best was a smaller U.S. military staff footprint which was combined with actors from various key support agencies. In each instance, the U.S. military provided the tactical operating center.

General Recommendations

Recommendations for foreign disaster relief operations are twofold. First, the U.S. should standardize its military force package for foreign disaster relief. Force packages for these operations have been fairly constant and there are numerous advantages to creating a standardized force package. Second, the U.S. should integrate this standard U.S. military

disaster relief force package with the U.N. Integrating with the U.N. assists in the overall effectiveness of foreign disaster relief operations and builds international legitimacy.

U.S. Military Force Recommendations by U.N. Cluster

Through the above analysis it is evident that U.S. military forces should be selected according to three major criteria. The first criterion is their capability to provide effective support within the desired U.N. cluster. The second criterion is their ability to rapidly deploy to worldwide. The third criterion is their ability to operate effectively as a task force. The forces identified in the following clusters are meant for the largest scale operations. It is possible that different scales of smaller size can be used dependent on which capabilities are required.

Logistics Cluster - The logistics cluster includes the areas of rotary wing support, cargo movement and documentation, onward movement of supplies, water purification and base camp support. In order to support these missions units from all services will be required.

The Navy should be directed to support the U.N. logistics cluster with an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that is afloat. An ARG is the best mix of speed and logistical capability that can support short duration disaster relief operations. The ARG contains ample rotary wing assets and various amphibious ships that can operate in shallow draft unimproved ports. The MEU would serve as the key ground element as it is “task organized to be a forward deployed presence and designed to be the first on the scene force.”⁴⁶ In addition, it is “capable of executing a wide range of small scale contingencies including humanitarian and civic action operations.”⁴⁷

The Army should be directed to support the U.N. logistics cluster with port opening capabilities from Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), Movement

Control Teams, air transportable service units such as mortuary affairs and water purification and if applicable, elements to support a Joint Logistics Over the Shore Operation (JLOTS). SDDC has specific port opening units that are capable of deploying short notice to manage ports. These forces can be extremely beneficial in coordinating the reception and onward movement of cargo at sea and air ports. In addition, Army Movement Control Teams are small with limited equipment and deploy quickly. These units specialize in providing coordination for onward movement to reduce bottle necks at key lines of communication. Army water purification units and mortuary affairs units have limited cargo and could fly into theater quickly. These units could provide key logistical assets to alleviate immediate human suffering and bridge capability gaps in affected areas. Only in rare instances which require long term presence should logistical capabilities from Brigade Combat Teams, rotary wing units, and Sustainment Brigades be tasked to support foreign disaster relief operations. These units are highly capable of supporting disaster relief but take immense logistical effort to deploy.

The Air Force should be directed to provide heavy lift, airfield management and airfield clearance support for the U.N. logistics cluster. Airlift is one of the most important transportation requirements at the onset of disaster relief operations. This lift can only be utilized with clear airfields and air traffic control. These types of units are easily deployable and provide high pay offs during initial efforts to move cargo into APODs.

Medical Cluster - The United States Navy should be directed to provide medical support to the U.N. health cluster. The most capable assets that can rapidly arrive in affected areas are the United States Navy Ships (USNS) Comfort and Mercy. One or both of these assets can provide rapid level III care in theater and can augment other relief agencies medical

assets. These assets could also support MEDEVAC with support of rotary wing and personnel support from the ARG. Last, these assets carry a highly visible symbolic asset of U.S. This many times more than statistics is most important to achieving U.S. strategic objectives during foreign disaster relief operations. U.S. Army field medical hospitals are highly capable of supporting disaster relief operations but are too cumbersome to rapidly deploy.

Early Recovery Cluster - The Navy SEABEES should be directed to provide engineer support to the U.N. early recovery cluster. Like Army engineer units, SEABEES have a cumbersome equipment footprint and take an extended period of time to deploy to affected areas. However, Navy SEABEES specialize in the types of engineering operations required during foreign disaster relief operations. Some unique skill sets Navy SEABEES have include runway, airfield and supply route repair, underwater construction, amphibious construction, civil engineer support and mobile utility support⁴⁸. All of these key tasks are essential to early post-disaster recovery.

Information Management Cluster – The Combatant Command from the affected Area of Responsibility should provide a mobile, tactical headquarters and small staff to assist in commanding and controlling initial relief operations. This staff should not be overly robust and mirror the JFCOM JECC model. Command and control structure should be coordination intensive and focusing on integrating all relevant support agencies in one tactical coordination center. If this is done in a coordinating manner rather than a lead agency manner, U.S. military Command and Control assets and expertise can provide an immense value added at the onset of operations.

Conclusion

The U.S. military has supported foreign disaster relief operations consistently throughout the last 49 years. Recent trends point to continued support of these operations for years to come. Military force standardization and integration with the U.N. is an excellent way to continue support of these operations. Standardization of U.S. military forces will decrease response time, increase proficiency of forces and decrease costs. Integrating with the U.N. will build international cooperation and legitimacy and increase the overall unity of effort during international disaster relief operations. Most importantly these changes will result in more effective support to affected populations.

NOTES

¹ United Nations Website, www.business.un.org How are disaster relief efforts organized?, Cluster Approach, Slide 1

² United Nations Website, www.business.un.org, How are disaster relief efforts organized?, Cluster Approach, Slide 1

³ United Nations Website, www.business.un.org, How are disaster relief efforts organized?, Cluster Approach, Slide 1

⁴ World Health Organization Website, www.who.int, Groundbreaking Approach to Disaster Relief, Page 1

⁵ Joint Publication 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 17 March 2009, Pages I-1 – I-2

⁶ Joint Publication 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 17 March 2009, Pages I-1 – I-2

⁷ U.S. National Security Strategy, May 2010, Page 39

⁸ U.S. National Security Strategy, May 2010, Page 47

⁹ Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damages, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs, March 2010, Page 5

¹⁰ Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damages, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs, March 2010, Page 5

¹¹ Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damages, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs, March 2010, Page 5

¹² Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damages, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs, March 2010, Page 5

¹³ Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damages, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs, March 2010, Page 5

¹⁴ Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damages, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs, March 2010, Page 16

¹⁵ Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damages, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs, March 2010, Page 5

¹⁶ Operation Unified Response Haiti Earthquake Response, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, May 2010, Page 13

¹⁷ Operation Unified Response Haiti Earthquake Response, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, May 2010, Page 13

¹⁸ C2 – Coordinate and Collaborate, Lieutenant General Ken Keen, DoD Live, March 22, 2010, Page 1

¹⁹ Narrative History of Operation Unified Response (as of May 25, 2010), United States Southern Command, November 1, 2010, Page 3.

²⁰ Narrative History of Operation Unified Response (as of May 25, 2010), United States Southern Command, November 1, 2010, Page 3.

²¹ Narrative History of Operation Unified Response (as of May 25, 2010), United States Southern Command, November 1, 2010, Page 3.

²² Narrative History of Operation Unified Response (as of May 25, 2010), United States Southern Command, November 1, 2010, Page 3.

²³ Natural Disaster, manmade response: US assets dominate Haiti relief effort, Jane's Navy International, Sam LaGrone, 22 February 2010, Page 3

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